Regimental History - Page 2

Major House, according to my instructions, endeavored to surround and keep in the Indians until word could be sent me; but this was an impossibility with 300 men, as the encampment was very large, mustering at least 1,200 warriors. This number is what the Indians say they had; but I, as well as everybody in the command, say over 1,500.

These Indians were partly Santees, Cutheads, Yanktonais, and some Blackfeet, and as I have since learned, Unkpapas, the same party who fought General Sibley and destroyed the Mackinaw boat. Of this I have unmistakable proof from letters and papers found in the camp, and on the persons of some of the Indians, besides relics of the Minnesota massacre, also from the fact that they told Mr. LaFromboise, the guide, when he was surrounded by about 200 of them, that 'they had fought General Sibley, and they could not see why the whites wanted to come to fight them unless they were tired of living and wanted to die.'

Mr. LaFromboise succeeded in getting away from them after some difficulty, and ran his horse a distance of more than ten miles to give me information, Major House with his command still remaining there. He reached me a little after 4 o'clock. I immediately turned out my command. The horses at the time were out grazing. At the sound of the bugle the men rushed with a cheer, and in a very few minutes saddled up and were in line. I left four companies and all the men who were poorly mounted in the camp,with orders to strike the tents and corral all the wagons and, starting off, with the Second Nebraska on the right, the Sixth Iowa on the left, one company of the Seventh Iowa and the battery in the center, at a full gallop, we made the distance of over ten miles in much less than an hour.

On reaching near the ground I found the enemy were leaving, and carrying off what plunder they could. Many lodges, however, were still standing. I ordered Colonel Furnas, Second Nebraska, to push his horses to the utmost, so as to reach the camp and assist Major House in keeping the Indians corralled. This order was obeyed with great alacrity, the regiment going over the plains at a full run. I was close to the rear of the regiment with the Sixth Iowa. The Second Nebraska took to the right of the camp, and was soon lost in a cloud of dust over the hills. I ordered Colonel Wilson, Sixth Iowa, to take the left; while I, with the battery, one company of the Seventh Iowa, Captain Millard, and two companies of the Sixth Iowa, Major TenBroeck commanding, charged through the center of the encampment. I found here an Indian Chief, by the name of Little Soldier, with some few of his people. This Indian has always had the reputation of being a "good Indian" and friendly. I placed them under guard and moved on.

Shortly after, I met with the notorious chief, Big Head, and some of his men. They were dressed for a fight, but my men cut them off. These Indians, together with some of their warriors, mustering about 30, together with squaws and children, numbering in all over 120, gave themselves up. About the same time, firing began about half a mile ahead, and was kept up, becoming more and more brisk until it was quite a considerable engagement.

    A report was brought to me (which proved to be false) that the Indians were driving back some of my command. I immediately took possession of the hillocks nearby, forming line and placing the battery in the center on a higher knoll. At this time, night had about set in, but still the engagement was briskly kept up and in the melee it was hard to distinguish my line from that of the enemy.

The Indians made a fiery desperate resistance, but finally broke and fled, pursued in every direction by bodies of my troops. I would state that the troops, though mounted, were armed with rifles, and according to my orders dismounted and fought on foot until the enemy broke, when they remounted and went in pursuit. It is to be regretted that I could not have had an hour or two more daylight, for I feel sure if I had, I could have annihilated the enemy.

As it was, I believe I can safely say I gave them one of the most severe punishments that Indians have ever received. After night set in, the engagement was of such a promiscuous nature that it was hard to tell what results would happen. I therefore ordered all the buglers to sound the "rally" and, building large fires, remained under arms during the night, collecting together my troops.

The next morning early (September 4th), I established my camp on the battlefield, the wagon train, under charge of Major Pearman, Second Nebraska, having in the night been ordered to join me, and sent out strong scouting parties in different directions to scour the country and to overtake what Indians they could, but in this they were not very successful, though some of them had slight skirmishes. They found the dead and wounded in all directions, some miles from the battlefield; also immense quantities of provisions, baggage, etc. One party that I sent out near the James River, found there eleven dead Indians. The deserted camp of the Indians, together with the country around it, was covered with their plunder. I devoted this day, together with the following (the 5th) to destroying all this property, still scouring the country...A very large number of ponies were found dead and wounded on the field 1865, besides a large number were captured. The prisoners (some 130) I take with me below, and shall report to you more especially in regard to them."

The remaining portion of General Sully's report gives very full details as to the casualties among the Indians and to his own command, both in the battle and in subsequent skirmishes in which his scouting parties were engaged; describes the hardships endured upon the return march and every incident which he considered worthy f note; but, for the purpose of this history, it is briefly condensed as follows:

One of his scouting parties fell into an ambuscade and lost four men killed by the Indians.

Another detachment was sent out and succeeded in overtaking and killing three Indians.

One hundred Indians were found. The officers and guides estimated the total number of Indians killed at 150. The hill near which the engagement took place was called by the Indians "Whitestone," hence the battle was officially designated "White Stone Hill." The conduct of the troops under his command is highly commended by the General. He states that the official reports of Colonel Wilson of the Sixth Iowa, and Colonel Furnas of the Second Nebraska, accompany his own, and highly commends both for their bravery and cheerful obedience to his orders, and makes mention of the fact that both these officers had their horses shot under them.

Upon the return to Fort Pierre, his command made rapid marches, the rations being barely sufficient to enable them to reach the fort. The horses were almost entirely worn out on the march. The command reached the mouth of the Little Cheyenne River on the 11th of September, and found the steamboat which General Sully had previously ordered to be there to meet him on his return. Had the boat--which was loaded with provisions for the man and grain for the animals--failed to reach the place designated, the train could not have been taken through to Fort Pierre, as the grass was then about all gone. The wounded men were placed on the boat, and a part of the empty wagons, thus relieving the worn out mules and enabling them to haul the remaining wagons to the fort. The loss of both horses and mules on the return march had been heavy. As fast as they gave out they were killed, to prevent them from falling into the hands of the Indians. By actual count the number of Indian prisoners was 156 -- 32 men and 124 women and children. General Sully had between 600 and 700 men actually engaged in the battle of White Stone Hill, of which 20 were killed and 38 wounded. Of this number, 22 were of the Sixth Iowa, as shown in the official report of Colonel Wilson, which describes in detail the conduct of his regiment, and is here given in part as follows:

THE BATTLE OF WHITE STONE HILL
September 3, 1863


Sir, I have the honor to submit to you an account of the participation of the Sixth Iowa Cavalry in the Battle of White Stone Hill, on the 3rd day of September, 1863. As you are aware, the command left the mouth of the Big Cheyenne on the 21st day of August last. Nothing occurred to vary the monotony of the usual hard marches until the above date. On the morning of that day I received an order from you to detail from my command one battalion the turn of the Third Battalion to scout, an order was issued directing Major A.F. House to report to your headquarters for instructions, which was promptly done. Company M, commanded by Captain V.J. Williams, of said battalion, having their horses used up by constant scouting, was unable to proceed with the detail, its place being supplied by Company H, of the Second Battalion. The detail for the scout was Company C, L.A. Ainsworth, Captain; Company I, L.R. Wolfe, Captain; Company F, S. Shattuck, Captain and Company H in it in this battle. They left the command at an early hour. After the departure of the battalion, the brigade took up its line of march to a point ten miles east of this place, where we arrived about 2 o'clock P.M. In the space of two hours, the messenger dispatched by Major House rode swiftly into camp with the information that there was a very large body of Indians near him, and that he was in the process of negotiating with them, until we could arrive.

It was but the work of a few minutes for the whole command to be upon its way to the battlefield. The ten miles distance was quickly passed. When we neared the battlefield, I received an order from you directing me to take one of my battalions in addition to the Third. The First was taken by me, and the Second vitas left with brigade headquarters. I then proceeded to carry out your orders to surround the Indians and drive them in.

On every side of the battlefield were straggling Indians, endeavoring to escape. Immediately joining the flank of the First upon the Second Battalion, and marching both in line, we succeeded in driving a large portion of the Indians toward your headquarters down into a ravine. By the shifting and dressing of the line as it marched, I became detached from the First, and was thrown into the Third Battalion. The Indians, after having been driven quietly for quite a distance, into a common center, availed themselves of the darkness that was coming, by suddenly firing upon us, which fire, though entirely unexpected, was immediately returned by us with terrible effect. We then commenced making preparations to fight on foot, when the darkness became so impenetrable that it was impossible to proceed further. It was at this fire of the enemy when, riding some little distance in advance of the battalion, that my horse was shot and fatally wounded with a slug. he lived long enough to carry me about thirty rods. After the darkness set in we went into camp immediately on the battlefield, corralled our horses and threw out pickets; while the command slept upon its arms. The night was excessively dark and cold. The guard killed two Indians that were found straggling near our camp. At length the day appeared when we found that the enemy, as availing themselves of the darkness, had suddenly decamped, but leaving the country strewed for miles around with their dried meats, provisions, packs, robes, teepees and ponies. We lost in this engagement one commissioned officer and ten privates killed, and had eleven wounded, one of them since dying, some of the rest being badly wounded and some very slightly.

I wish to call to your particular attention very one of the field and line officers of the regiment without enumerating them by name. From the highest to the lowest they deserve the most favorable consideration; and the same may be said of almost the entire command engaged. Being their first battle, this was their baptism of fire and steel and most nobly did they behave. This high reputation earned by the noble action of the Iowa troops upon the bloody fields of battle has not been tarnished by the gallant Sixth Iowa at White Stone Hill. I have the honor to be
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
D.S. WILSON, Colonel Sixth Iowa Cavalry
CAPTAIN J.H. PELL, A.A.G."

It may be inferred that General Sully had instructions to surround the Indians and, if possible, secure their surrender without a fight, although he does not say that he had such instructions in his report. The statement that the guide, Frank LaFromboise, was "surrounded by about two hundred Indians, from whom he succeeded in getting away after come difficulty, plainly indicates that he was holding a conference with them and endeavoring to persuade them to give up their arms and return peaceably to their reservations, and that he could not have been allowed to return to General Sully, unless it was for the purpose of conveying a message from the Indians, which was probably of such a character that it caused the General to consider further negotiations useless. In the subsequent movement of his troops against the Indians it will be observed that the advance continued with the purpose of surrounding the Indians, who opened fire just as darkness was coming on. If the movement to surround them had been successful, it seems most likely that another opportunity would have been given them to surrender without a conflict. The inference is strengthened by the report of Colonel Wilson, in which he states that, at the time Major House sent his message to General Sully, advising him of the discovery of the Indian encampment, he was in process of negotiating with them for the purpose of holding them in check until the General could arrive with the rest of his command, and by his further statement that the Indians had been driven "quietly" for quite a distance towards a common center, and when they suddenly opened fire upon his troops, it was "entirely unexpected." The question whether such an inference is justified by the facts is involved in doubt, by the previous statement in General Sully's report, that he intended to surround the camp of the Indians during the night and attack them at daylight. In any event, the punishment inflicted upon the Indians was well deserved, and was not even adequate, when compared with the terrible massacres of men, women and children, of which they had been guilty.

In obedience to his orders to select an eligible location for the building of another fort, General Sully selected a site on the east bank of the Missouri River, about fifteen miles below Fort Pierre. The work of constructing the fort was begun by the Sixth Iowa Cavalry, but before its completion, General Sully...leaving Lieutenant Colonel Pollock with five companies of the Sixth Iowa to finish the work and to remain as a garrison at the fort, marched with the rest of his command to Fort Randall, and thence to Sioux City. The detachment of the Sixth Iowa completed the construction of the fort, which was officially designated as "Fort Sully in honor of the distinguished soldier who was in command of all the troops then engaged in the defense of the northern frontier.


     


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